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WORLD POPULATION: AN UNWISHFUL 
ASSESSMENT, A HOPEFUL PROPOSAL 
William G. Hollingsworth * 
Unfortunately, few political leaders appreciate the urgency of 
the population problem, because they are not aware of the enor-
mous momentum built into current population growth rates. 
This momentum is particularly ominous in developing countries 
as a result of the tremendous increases in the numbers of people 
entering the childbearing years. For example, a developing 
country that has a 3 percent population growth rate and wishes 
to have its population level off at double its present numbers 
must reduce its average family size from over four children per 
family to slightly over two children per family in steady stages 
within the next ten years. If it waits twenty years before starting 
such a ten-year program to reduce family size, its population will 
grow to nearly four times its present numbers. 
-Richard N. Gardner (emphasis his)** 
"Hell is truth seen too late." 
-Thomas Hobbes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Present world population of over 4.5 billion appears to be growing 
at an annual rate of about 1.8 percent.1 Should humankind continue 
to grow at this seemingly low rate, the number of human beings 
• Copyright © 1983 by William G. Hollingsworth, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa 
College of Law. 
•• Gardner, A World Action Plan to Limit Population Growth, SATURDAY REVIEW/WORLD, 
July 27, 1974, at 11, 47. 
1. M. KENT, 1983 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET OF THE POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 
INC. (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 DATA SHEET]. 
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would double every thirty-nine years.2 This would mean-but, of 
course, does not assure-a human population of about nine billion by 
the year 2020. 
To look only at worldwide figures, however, obscures the well-
known reality that present population growth is concentrated in the 
world's most economically distressed regions. Based on data from 
the late 1970's, much of Asia is experiencing annual growth rates 
above 2 percent, which represents a population doubling time of less 
than thirty-five years.3 Latin America's population is growing at 2.3 
percent per year, a popUlation doubling time of thirty years;' Africa 
is growing at a 3 percent annual rate, a population doubling time of 
twenty-three years. 6 If a nation's population continues to grow at an 
annual rate of 3 percent-a growth rate that many nations today 
either approach, equal, or even exceed-the resulting population in-
crease in a century will be nineteenfold.6 Even a one percent annual 
rate, well below the world's 1.8 percent growth rate, would yield a 
270 percent population increase in 100 years. 7 
Juxtaposed with the foregoing data is the doctrine-or the 
myth-of absolute national sovereignty. One by-product of the ab-
solutizing of national sovereignty is the assumption that each nation 
is ethically free to decide against limiting its population growth. In-
deed, a large and growing population historically has been viewed as 
a signpost of national success and an essential element of national 
power. Nonetheless, contemporary awareness of the massive 
tragedy invited by uncontrolled population growth mandates an im-
mediate reevaluation of the view that each nation is free to grow 
without limits. In response to this sometimes feeble but inereasing 
awareness, this article will consider the need for and prescribe a 
population limitation ethical imperative for the world's nations. The 
article will attempt an ethical inquiry into and offer recommenda-
2. Id. One, of course, does not expect the world's population growth rate to remain forever 
constant. 
3. See id. 
4.Id. 
5.Id. 
6. L. BROWN, IN THE HUMAN INTEREST 22 (1974). 
7. Id. Due to the combination of high birth rates and rural-to-urban migration, many Third 
World cities will experience growth in excess of 3% in the decades just ahead. Many will triple 
in size over the next twenty-five years. If present trends continue, the population of Cairo will 
exceed 15 million, and Sao Paulo will exceed 25 million, by the end of this century. Mexico City 
will have to accommodate-somehow-over 30 million persons. See Beir, Can Third World 
Cities Cope?, Population Bulletin, XXXI, No.4, at 8-9 (Dec. 1976). In these and other already 
poverty-laden cities, the outlook for human dignity and freedom is grim. 
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tions as to the population goals of nations. The obviously vital but 
generally secondary questions of means, both international and in-
tranational, must be dealt with elsewhere. 
II. OBSTACLES TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM 
A. Our Biases 
Our predilections against "zero population growth" (ZPG)8 are of a 
primordial, instinctual nature. Despite the severe stresses already 
being caused by increasing population, the wish to discourage popu-
lation growth still somehow seems inhospitable, ungenerous, unmag-
nanimous, anti-humanitarian, and sinister. Likewise, the ethical 
problems involved in attempting to achieve worldwide ZPG are cap-
able of tormenting any morally sensitive soul. Thus, for highly per-
sonal, highly emotional, and often morally important reasons, most if 
not all people most desperately would like to believe that the call for 
a serious global effort toward population stability is a false and 
neglectable imperative. After all, how many persons with any claim 
to social virtue want to risk sullying their own possibly fragile moral 
self-image or reputation? Accordingly, some polemicists have 
depicted ZPG, indeed have depicted the entire ecology movement, as 
the modern elitist equivalent of keeping the king's hunting preserves 
untrampled by the common folk. With equally tragic misguidance, 
others have condemned the idea of worldwide ZPG as neo-colonial-
ism, neo-racism, even as racial genocide-a set of judgments in 
perfect conflict with the well-being and the survival of the very 
peoples the judgers are purporting to protect. Still others have 
played off the idea of striving for a stabilized world population 
against the idea of transforming the affluent nations' high-
consumption, high-pollution economic behavior, as if humanity is apt 
to have the luxury of choosing only one of the two remedies. 
By far the worthiest personal, emotional, and moral impetus 
against a social commitment to a nongrowth rate of human reproduc-
tion is simply the justifiably extremely high valuation that any car-
ing person places upon every individual human being and upon the 
sacred vocation of parenthood. Yet, never has so authentic a pair of 
moral valuations sired so inauthentic and anti-humane an ideology of 
absolute laissez faire. Like all ideologies positing absolute in-
8. "Zero population growth" (ZPG) is an often used synonym for population stability, i.e., no 
numerical growth. 
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dividualism, the doctrine that deciding how many children to have is 
a purely private matter ignores basic social facts. The reality is that 
in deciding to conceive fewer children than they biologically 
could-which describes the behavior of almost all couples in almost 
all societies-individual couples do indeed limit the creation of other 
infinitely valuable individuals. All such individual decisions are likely 
to be influenced socially to some nontrivial extent. Nonetheless, a 
socially explicit decision to discourage other people from having as 
many children as they otherwise might have wanted seems to offend 
virtually every liberal, libertarian, and Judiac-Christian value. 
B. Our Fallacies 
For the foregoing and other reasons, some sublime, some not so 
sublime, numerous thoughtful and not-so-thoughtful souls have suc-
cumbed to an epidemic of self-deceptive wishful thinking. Minds 
capable of far better thinking have accepted or espoused fallacious 
and unrealistic arguments to avoid confronting the admittedly 
soulrending moral imperative of global population limits. 
Perhaps the most simplistic fallacy concerning population is to 
view the matter purely as a problem of physical space. Generally, the 
argument runs thusly: "If we ever run out of places to put people on 
the earth's land, we can always build floating cities on the sea or 
[currently more popular] orbit them around the earth and/or eolonize 
the moon and other nearby·celestial pieces of real estate." Unfortu-
nately, such "solutions" utterly fail to grasp the nature of the prob-
lem. The problem of population limits consists of the relationship be-
tween numbers of people and the supply of all the resources neces-
sary to sustain persons in a state of at least minimal well-being. In 
this light, to say that we have or expect to have one, some, or even 
most of the necessary resources will not do. The lack of anyone es-
sential resource is the sufficient condition for massive tragedy. 
Whatever the concern at issue, the wishful thinkers profess an ab-
solute religious faith in the power 'of technology to supply every need 
or to solve every problem, at least in the long run.9 As to the food 
9. See generally J. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981). In this work human ingenuity 
acquires the infinite creative power of a super deity: it has the potential to service however 
many people there ever are by creating all the appropriate resources needed forever (except 
during "temporary shortages"). See id. at 345-48. Although Simon's book is replete with 
graphs and charts, his data fail utterly to support his leap of technological faith. An important 
reason for the failure is the fallacy of blindly assuming that a world ecosystem attempting to 
support anywhere from 7 to 9 billion people or more as well as all their industries will function 
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needs of increased billions, it has been confidently denied that the 
supply of land or of any other natural resource will constrain the 
world's food supply for "the foreseeable future."10 Essentially, there 
are only two ways to increase food production. One is by increasing 
per-acre yield; the other is to increase the total acreage devoted to 
food production. The development of synthetic food materials and 
the exploitation of alternative resources such as ocean harvesting do 
not alter the primacy of these two approaches; rather they are incor-
porated in the two approaches. 
With regard to the first approach, increasing the per-acre yield, 
W orldwatch Institute's Lester Brown has reported that food produc-
tion increases in the last three decades have "entailed land abuse so 
severe that fully one-fifth and perhaps as much as one-third of the 
world's cropland is losing topsoil at a rate that is undermining its 
long-term productivity."ll In addition, should anything like today's 
population growth rate continue much longer, achieving the required 
increases in per-acre yield is apt to necessitate massive increases in 
the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, a prospect that threat-
ens the planet's biological processes.12 These are not the only 
dangers. As University of California at Berkeley Professor John 
Holdren has warned, increasing food production to meet population 
demands could require the further curtailment of what little agricul-
tural diversity exists. Such an agricultural system would plant only 
the very highest yield crop strains, thus sacrificing humanity's hedge 
against general crop failure from pests, disease, unforseen weather 
conditions, and other naturally occurring problems. IS Hence, the 
strategy to increase food production could itself cause massive 
famine. This remains so with or without the utilization of "synthetic 
food factories." 
No matter what crops are planted, world agricultural production is 
subject to sudden and drastic reduction due to major global climatic 
with the same efficiency and effectiveness as did a world ecosystem supporting 2 to 4 billion 
people and their industries. This is like saying to a blindfolded runner in canyon country, 
"Keep on going at full speed. You haven't fallen off a cliff yet." For other criticisms, see 
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, VIII, No.1, at 163-77 (Mar. 
1982). 
10. J. SIMON, supra note 9, at 68. 
11. L. BROWN, BmLDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 5 (1981). 
12. Concerning fertilizer, see Borgstrom, Never Before Has Humankind Had To Face the 
Problem of Feeding So Many People With So Little Food, SMITHSONlAN, VII, No.4, at 71, 76 
(July 1976). 
13. See Holdren, Population and the American Predicament: The Case Against Ccrmplacen-
cy, DAEDALUS, CII, No.4, at 31, 40 & n.18, 43 (Fall 1973). 
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changes, changes that have been the norm rather than the exception 
in human and pre-human history. As a result, continuing population 
growth at rates that will effectively preclude the achievement of a 
substantial agricultural margin of safety is a virtual guarantee of 
macrocosmic famine sooner or later.14 
The only other way to increase food production-and we will cer-
tainly have to employ both ways-is to increase the total acreage 
devoted to agriculture. As Michigan State Professor Georg Borg-
strom has noted, "The awareness of what it takes in land, water, and 
storage to feed each person has, by and large, been dissipated in the 
euphoria of alleged technical and economic miracles."l5 The enlarge-
14. It has been suggested that some margin of safety now exists in the considerable poten-
tial for redistributing the present level of agricultural production. Of principal importance, af-
fluent nations could curtail the extremely wasteful use of plant protein involved in those na-
tions' excessive meat production and consumption. Thus, a significant portion of present 
livestock feed production acreage and grazing lands could be used to produce grains and other 
plant foods for direct human consumption worldwide. Although one can scarcely imagine a 
more difficult undertaking politically and administratively, such a redistribution ought to be 
attempted. Unfortunately, however, any plausibly imaginable degree of success is not apt to 
do more than reduce much existing undernutrition-hardly an insignificant feat. But even if 
present needs could be nearly or barely met with existing output, that victory would provide 
no margin of safety against a major setback in agricultural production. Much less would mere 
redistribution suffice with continuing increases in population. 
15. Borgstrom, supra note 12, at 74. I haven't forgotten the sea with its "three-
dimensional" acreage. Nonetheless, Jacques Cousteau suspects there may have been a 30 per-
cent decline in the intensity of marine life in the last 20 years. The likeliest causes are man's 
overexploitation and pollution. Worldwatch Institute's Lester Brown notes that, despite 
enormously increased and technologically sophisticated investment in fishing fleets and fish 
farming, the world's fish catch has leveled off since 1970, with the annual fish supply per per-
son falling by 13%. L. BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS AND POPULATION POLICY: A TIME FOR 
REASSESSMENT, WORLDWATCH PAPER 29, at 8 (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as L. BROWN, 
RESOURCE TRENDS]. As for the highly uncertain potential from massive sea farming and the 
like, one must hope, pray, beg, and implore that man will tread extremely softly and assess 
with great care the possible consequences of any further major disruption of the world's grave-
ly jeopardized underwater biology and chemistry. There is nothing at stake except an 
indispensable link in the planet's life chain and the primordial source of all earthly life. 
[W]ater, as the universal solvent, is easier to pollute than soil; physical and chemical 
contamination of bodies of water have detrimental or lethal effects on acquatic 
organisms or their consumers and are much more difficult to prevent or control than 
is the case for expanses of land. Also, aquaculture organisms tend to concentrate 
pollutants. Pollution is often heaviest in some of the places where ocean-based 
aquaculture would thrive best. Aquaculture is limited to regions with enough water in 
the desired form (temperature, salinity, etc.) for a specific crop. Costs for large scale 
industrial production of aquaculture tend to make the product available only as high 
price luxury food; pumps, tanks, feed and labor costs are high. Fish disease is difficult 
to control because of the water medium and crowded conditions. 
M. GABEL HO-PING: FOOD FOR EVERYONE, 161 (1979) (omitting his numerical listing format). 
Even so, "[a]quaculture has very high productivity in many situations." ld. 
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ment of agricultural land acreage is already causing extremely 
serious problems. Writes Professor Borgstrom: 
In the course of Man's quest for food more than half the world's 
forest cover has vanished, large areas of grassland have been 
plowed, and major groundwater reserves irreversibly drawn 
down. China and India ... have both paid a very high ecological 
price for their millions. Forest and pasturelands have been 
squeezed down to wholly inadequate levels. Erosion, desertifica-
tion, waterlogging and salination have destroyed much tilled 
land and are jeopardizing still more. Irrigation reservoirs are 
filling with silt at ten times the anticipated rate. 16 
The needs of a surging world population will require that more and 
more land be cleared and otherwise altered for both agricultural and 
non-agricultural uses. In the words of Rene Dubos: 
man will have to eliminate all forms of wildlife that would com-
pete with him for space and for food; . . . he will tolerate wild 
landscapes only to the extent that they serve his needs . . . . 
Man will thus destroy all the aspects of the environment under 
which he evolved as a species and which have created his present 
biological beingY 
The costs and risks inherent in substantially increased environ-
mental destruction are much more than a matter of elitist aesthetics. 
Concerning the costs, Erik Eckholm writes as follows: 
Since the impending large-scale loss of species is without prece-
dent and involves the disruption of ecological systems whose 
complexity is beyond human grasp, no means exist for quantify-
ing the costs. . . . Some species of proven economic value are 
under acute pressure, but perhaps the greatest social costs of 
species destruction will stem from future opportunities unknow-
ingly lost. [For example, o]nly a small fraction of the earth's 
plant species have been screened for medically useful ingredi-
ents. 18 
Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel had earlier attempted to sug-
gest the awesome risks, as they stated: 
Today we understand much better than our ancestors that the 
existence of all life on Earth-our own included-depends on the 
stability of the ecological system. An Earth with less diverse in-
habitants might not continue to possess the stability essential 
16. Borgstrom, supra note 12, at 74. 
17. Dubos, Second Edition: Does Man Have A Future, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, No.2, at 57, 
58 (1971). 
18. E. ECKHOLM, DISAPPEARING SPECIES: THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE, WORLDWATCH PAPER 22, 
at 12, 15 (July 1978). 
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for adaptation and survival. And if our ecosystem breaks 
down-even if only temporarily-the effect on mankind will be 
calamitous. The ultimate irony confronting technological man 
may well reside in the fact that Nature's most potent threats to 
human welfare are not her destructive power-earthquakes, tor-
nadoes and hurricanes-but the fragility of the web of life, the 
delicacy of those skeins which bind species to species and which 
comprise the dynamic bonds which relate the animate and in-
animate realms so inextricably in the process of life.19 
One should also understand that the demands of a growing world 
population go well beyond the individual's need for food and stand-
ing-sitting-sleeping space. We must reject in toto the following par-
ticularly fallacious argument. The argument asserts that there·is no 
reason to be very concerned about high population growth rates in 
the so-called "Third World" because the peoples of those nations use 
so little energy and other resources and cause such little pollution. 
Surely one cannot accept ethically the unstated assumption of this 
argument: that hundreds of millions of present and future Asians, 
Mricans, and Latin Americans cl:).tl and should be expected to spend 
the rest of their lives on a bare subsistence diet crowded beside some 
barren hovel while ensuing generations of North Americans and Eu-
ropeans in the so-called "first two worlds" continue to watch their 
television sets and go for Sunday drives. Here indeed is a neo-colo-
nialist and genuinely racist approach to population policy. 20 
III. TOWARD A CARING REALISM: THE BASIC PROPOSAL 
Both minimal justice and political reality require us to ask a very 
tough question. How, in fact, would humankind be able to produce 
and, where necessary, transport enough heat, shelter, clothing, 
19. M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TuRNING POINT 13 (1974). 
20. Besides its ethical unacceptability, the approach is factually false even as to the problem 
of satisfying people's basic needs: 
Villagers in the poor countries where firewood is used for cooking are decimating 
local forests. The average villager requires between one and two tons of firewood 
each year, and expanding village populations are raising firewood demands so fast 
that the regenerative capacities of many forests are being surpassed. . .. Under the 
population onslaught, forests recede farther and farther from the villages until entire 
regions and countries are eventually deforested. 
L. BROWN, THE TwENTY·NINTH DAY 23 (1978). 
Happily, Third World governments are becoming increasingly aware of the threat that con· 
tinued substantial population growth poses to their nations' well·being. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 2, 1981, S A, at 13, col. 1 ("Legislators from 19 Asian countries have concluded a United 
Nations-sponsored conference on population problems by proposing that their governments 
work to hold Asia's annual population growth rate to 1 percent by the end of the century"). 
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water and sanitation systems, medicine, hospitals, fertilizer, farm 
machinery, farm produce, education, communication, and other 
goods and services to meet at least the basic needs and most minimal 
amenities of eight, ten, twelve, or fourteen billion people without 
wreaking massive life-destroying havoc on the planet's already be-
leaguered environment? Even the congenital hyperoptimist must ad-
mit that there is a substantial chance that, even with the most earn-
est effort plausibly imaginable, humanity would not be able to devise 
and carry out humanely a feasible answer in time.21 Professor Hol-
dren warns of civilization's growing interference in the planet's "bi-
ological processes that provide us with services we do not know how 
to replace."22 His words deserve careful persual, as he states: 
The cycling of essential plant nutrients such as nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and sulfur is contingent at various stages on biolog-
ical processes, and these same cycles play an important role in 
the disposal of civilization's wastes. The environmental concen-
trations of ammonia, carbon monoxide, and hydrogen sul-
fide-all poisonous-are biologically controlled. These 'public 
service' functions of the biological environment cannot be 
replaced by technology now or in the next century. . . . 
The specific mechanisms by which civilization's activities are 
disrupting the performance of indispensable natural services 
. . . include selective poisoning of vulnerable organisms and the 
corresponding disruption of terrestrial and oceanic food webs, 
alteration of chemical balances in the environment, overexploi-
tation of commercial species, and the destruction of natural com-
munities serving as ecological buffers and reservoirs of species 
diversity .... 
. . . [M]ankind is systematically diminishing the capacity of the 
environment to perform its essential functions of pest control, 
nutrient cycling, waste management, and climate regulation, at 
the same time that growing population and rising consumption 
per person are creating even larger demands for these services. 
Evidently, the inadequacy of present scientific knowledge to 
predict the time and character of the ultimate breakdown in this 
process is often taken to be grounds for complacency, but our ig-
norance here should be alarming, not reassuring.2S 
So, like Noah, we are adequately forewarned. There is indeed a 
considerable and awesome risk that humanity could not humanely 
21. One must also admit that the attempt to cope with the needs and wants of increased 
billions of persons may well entail substantial losses of personal freedom, whether or not that 
attempt is successful. See generally Dubos, B'Upra note 17. 
22. Holdren, B'Upra note 13, at 33. 
23. [d. at 34. 
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provide for itself at a population anywhere close to double the 4.5 
billion figure of 1981 without seriously damaging the planet's poorly 
understood chemical-climatic-microorganismic support base for com-
plex life. It is because of this stated risk and for related earth-and-
people-caring reasons that the human race should at the very least 
commit itself to a general population goal. That goal should be to at-
tain as soon as is possible and to maintain for the foreseeable future a 
level or successive levels of reproduction in every nation no greater 
than what is needed for that nation's sustained population stability. 
This latter level of reproduction is what demographers call "the 
population replacement fertility rate" or, more simply, "replace-
ment fertility." 
Due to nations' differences in population mortality rates, the fer-
tility needed for continuous population replacement varies by nation 
from about 2.1 to about 2.5 children per woman in her lifetime.24 
Currently, replacement fertility rate for the United States means 
that women would bear an average of 2.1 children in their respective 
lifetimes.26 Obviously, prescribing any such maximum societal aver-
age for a nation does not necessarily mean prescribing a maximum 
for the individual person.26 It does require, however, broad social 
planning regarding population. A nation expecting any significant 
amount of net immigration should strive not to exceed a fertility rate 
that is slightly below replacement rate-so as to offset fully the addi-
tional childbearing caused by expected net immigration.27 Any such 
24. 1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1, at n.8. As of 1980 about 30 nations, among them the 
United States, had a fertility rate at or below replacement level. See L. BROWN, BUILDING A 
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 151 (1981). Although the total number of such nations now appears to 
be above 30, there are still more such nations in Europe than in the entire rest of the world. See 
1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1. 
Demographers frequently use the "total fertility rate" (TFR) in attempting to describe a na-
tion's fertility. The TFR "indicates the average number of children that would be born to each 
woman in a population if each were to live through her childbearing lifetime (usually con-
sidered ages 15-49) bearing children at the same rate as women of those ages actually did in a 
given year." Id. at n.8. 
25. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-25, No. 802, 
ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 1940 TO 
1978 at 2 (May 1979). 
26. Throughout this article the term "fertility" refers solely to births per woman and not to 
any individual's capacity for reproduction. 
27. A nation's downward adjustment of its overall fertility rate goal to offset the added 
childbearing resulting from future net immigration is sound policy: were net immigration to 
continue indefinitely and the nation's overall fertility rate to remain at unadjusted replace-
ment, its population theoretically would never stop increasing. Although I won't continue men-
tioning it, the foregoing adjustment is contemplated whenever this article advocates replace-
ment fertility as a societal maximum. 
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proposal must be examined not only in its mathematical aspects, but 
in the perspective of an overall concern for human life and the en-
vironment. 
A. Goal Assessment and Later Goal Modification 
This section will assess the reasonableness of the general fertility 
limitation goal proposed in the previous section, and it will also sug-
gest the probable later need for further goal modification in at least 
some nations. In assessing the reasonableness of replacement fertili-
ty as a proposed fertility ceiling for the world's nations, one must 
again consider the awesome risk of massive ecological harm. What 
are the mathematical chances that such harm will actually occur? 
Man's present state of combined knowledge and ignorance surely re-
quires that the probabilities for massive catastrophe be regarded as 
substantial. In addition, we can believe reasonably that the larger 
the world's population has grown by a given date the greater the 
Assuming legal net immigration into the United States of 400,000 persons per year, and 
assuming that the problem of illegal immigration can and will be fairly and humanely brought 
under effective control, to stay at or below "immigration-adjusted replacement" fertility in 
the United States would likely require that henceforth fertility rates average no more than 
about 1.98 children per wOUlan. See Coale, Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population, in 
COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, RESEARCH REPORTS VOL. I, 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH 598 (1972). Coale's fertility figure 
for long-term ZPG with 400,000 annual net immigration is 1.97, but it assumes a perpetual 
2.11 fertility rate in the foreign-born population. My figure of 1.98, approximately long-term 
ZPG fertility for both domestic- and foreign-born American women considered together is 
simply the average between the 1.97 and 2.11 figures, weighted according to the projected 
ultimately stabilized relative size of the two groups of persons under the 400,000 annual im-
migration assumption. Thanks to those women who will bear no children or have only one child 
in their lifetime, a 1.98 fertility rate does not preclude any woman who wants two children 
from having them. Nor, for the same reason, is it inconsistent with nature's full dose of multi-
ple births and with some couples' planning for more than two children. This is hardly surpris-
ing, for the total fertility rate in the United States currently is reported to be about 1.8. 1983 
DATA SHEET, supra note 1. Some demographers, however, suspect that lifetime fertility rates 
among women in the United States currently of childbearing age will prove to be higher. 
At this writing, regular immigration, refugee admissions, and illegal immigration are com-
bining to yield an annual United States net immigration substantially in excess of 400,000 per-
sons. A highly persuasive moral case can be made for the proposition that total annual net im-
migration henceforth should not be allowed to average more than the foregoing figure. Indeed, 
we should seriously consider seeking an annual total immigration rate substantially below 
400,000. In the United States alone, the resources spent to service the needs of and to create 
jobs for a large number of immigrants each year could do immensely greater humanitarian 
good if applied for the next few decades to critically needed international aid that would help 
hundreds of millions, even billions, of persons. For an excellent, concise analysis of contem-
porary and future immigration policy ethics, see John Tanton, International Migration and 
World Stability in ALTERNATIVES TO GROWTH-I: A SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 243-64 
(D. Meadows ed. 1977). 
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chance for massive catastrophe in attempting to provide for that 
population. Beyond these two truisms, any quantifications of the 
risks are nothing but guesses. Nevertheless, we are morally required 
to guess. 
Pretending no expertise, my guess is as follows. If, by continuing 
present growth rates, humankind reaches a population of over eight 
billion by the year 2020, less than forty years hence, there is at least 
a 50 percent chance that millions of human beings will die cruel and 
untimely deaths as a result of one or a combination of the following 
scenarios. First, the attempt to meet at least the material needs and 
minimal material wants of vastly increased numbers of people simply 
may prove woefully inadequate. Second, that heroic attempt, 
although superficially more or less successful, eventually may result 
in greatly increased environmental and ecological havoc causing 
greater mortality.2s In fact, a human population growing fast 
enough to reach or surpass the eight billion mark by 2020, due to the 
increased numbers of young people, most probably would continue 
growing rapidly and enormously in the several decades after 2020 
unless the growth were tragically ended by catastrophic mortality. 
Therefore, under the foregoing hypothetical, the chance of a 
massively tragic outcome by, say, 2060 is apt to be substantially 
higher than 50 percent. 
Even if the probability of tragedy is far lower than 50 percent, the 
gravity of the risk mandates corrective measures. This moral im-
perative is illustrated by the following hypothetical situation in a 
more limited context. Suppose the responsible ground official has 
good reason to believe and does in fact believe that if he allows Flight 
432 to proceed today as scheduled there is a one-in-twenty chance 
that the plane will fall to the ground, killing the crew and the passen-
gers. Suppose further that the officer decides to disregard this 
substantial risk and allows the flight to proceed. If the feared risk 
materializes into tragedy, society is faced with the question of what 
to do with someone who consciously disregarded a 5 percent risk of 
his causing the death of others. Assuming there was no need for the 
flight to take place as scheduled, the officer would almost certainly 
28. For evidence that with today's 4.3 billion human population, "human needs have begun 
to outstrip the productive capacity of many local biological systems as currently managed," 
see L. BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS 6-17 (1979) (quoted language at 7). Furthermore, "even six 
billion people would be excessive for some key resources. . .. Adequately supporting even 
[that number] will not be possible without greatly improved management of biological systems, 
widespread rationing, stringent energy conservation measures, recycling programs, and a 
more equitable distribution of vital resources such as food, land, and petroleum." Id. at 39. 
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be prosecuted for negligence, or manslaughter, and perhaps ought to 
be prosecuted even for murder. This conclusion would apply even if 
the unjustified 5 percent risk of death had threatened and then killed 
only one person.29 The question, therefore, is simply what prob-
ability of risk is low enough to be noncriminal when the risk involves 
millions or billions of human beings or even the very survival of the 
human species? Unless we abolish the concept of human worth, 
mankind cannot morally justify taking the ecological risks involved 
in any more lax a population policy than that of earnestly seeking 
overall fertility rates of no more than population replacement in 
every nation currently above replacement fertility. The only limi-
tation on this urgency is that such rates be achieved as soon as can 
occur humanely. Indeed, as will be explained below, for some future 
interim even replacement fertility is apt not to be a low enough fer-
tility ceiling for economically distressed nations currently experi-
encing rapid population growth. 
Even those nations which in relation to their human population 
seemingly have an abundance of forest, fertile land, and other 
resources should adhere to the replacement fertility ceiling. This is 
true for at least three reasons. First, there is the extreme 
unlikelihood of gaining an international consensus as to which na-
tions could prolong their higher-than-replacement fertility rates 
without substantial ecological or economic risk. Second, one serious-
ly doubts that there are nations today who truly need a larger 
popUlation. Finally, the population crisis is fundamentally a global 
crisis. Humanity qua humanity is in grave danger of creating a 
future in which the total number of human beings is far greater than 
the world's ecological, economic, and political resources can service 
29. I do, however, agree with Professors LaFave and Scott that "it would be nice, but not 
possible, to create a table of homicidal risk for purposes of distinguishing among homicidal 
crimes along some such lines as these: 
Below 1% chance of death-no homicide crime 
1 % to 5% chance of death-manslaughter 
Over 5% chance of death-murder. 
W.R. LAFAVE &A.W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 543 n.6 (1972). I also concur in 
their use and interpretation of the following nonfictional example: 
When defendant fired two bullets into the caboose of a passing train, thereby killing a 
brakeman, the chances were doubtless much greater that he would not kill than that 
he would kill. Perhaps the chances of killing were no more than 5%, taking into ac-
count the area of the side of the caboose in relationship to the space taken up by the 
vital parts of its occupants. In view of the lack of social utility in shooting into the side 
of the caboose, the risk of 5% was held enough for murder in that case. Banks v. 
State, 85 Tex. Crim, 165,211 S.W. 217 (1919). 
[d. at 543. 
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on even a minimally adequate basis. If there are nations who still 
have "too much" forest, fertile land, or other resources and still have 
"too few" people, under present conditions minimal moral duty to 
humanity requires that any such nation include itself within the no-
greater-than-replacement-fertility imperative. 80 
There is one arguable exception to the foregoing conclusion. This 
exception involves the nation that experiences some sort of massive 
tragedy or a series of tragedies yielding a drastic decrease in its 
population. If the decrease clearly was not caused by that nation's 
prior population growth, temporarily above-replacement fertility 
would be justified in order to offset the population loss to the extent 
that the regrowth in population would be compatible with economic 
sufficiency and ecological abundance. 
A global commitment to replacement fertility as a maximum norm 
for every nation is in no sense an extreme response to the population 
crisis. As was implied in the quoted passage beginning this article, 
due to very high birth rates of recent decades many nations have rec-
ord numbers of persons both at or below childbearing age. Because 
of this demographic momentum, even if the population of every na-
tion immediately could limit its reproduction to an approximate 
replacement rate, the world's population would continue to increase 
markedly-albeit less markedly than today-for several decades; it 
would not reach actual zero population growth until about seventy 
years had passed and world population had risen to above six billion 
persons.81 On the other hand, there appears to be an attainable goal 
which will require international aid and cooperation so that all the 
above-replacement-rate developing nations can gradually reduce 
their fertility rates to replacement over the next ten years. If this oc-
30. But what if nation X fears that its adherence to replacement or temporarily subreplace-
ment fertility eventually could make it vulnerable to aggression from larger or still growing 
nation Y? Actually, although the growth of modern weaponry has not made population size an 
irrelevant factor in a nation's military strength, it has, for better and for worse made it much 
less a critical factor than used to be the case. Nevertheless, if real or imaginary national 
defense fears should prove to be any impediment at all to reaching an adequate international 
ZPG consensus, those nations favoring the replacement fertility ceiling and/or any stricter 
temporary ceiling should forge a common defense alliance. The goal of the alliance should be to 
guarantee every participating member sufficient military support from the other members to 
repel aggression against it from any quarter outside or inside the membership. Obviously. the 
alliance should remain perpetually open to new converts. 
31. The projection just stated in the text is my rough adaptation of one made by 
demographer Tomas Frejka in 1973, based on the (also illusory) worldwide attainment of 
replacement fertility in 1975. See T. FREJKA, FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH, THE POPULATION 
COUNCIL CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES WORKING PAPERS at 15-16,19,22 (May 1977). 
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curs, the aggregate population of these nations will come fairly close 
to doubling before ZPG is actually achieved some time around 
2060.32 Even in this situation, world population would be approx-
imately eight billion persons.33 India, for example, would have to 
cope somehow with an eventual population of over one billion as com-
pared with today's 700 million. Bangladesh, struggling desperately 
to feed its present 95 million, would become a nation of well over 150 
million.34 Indeed, because they are now growing faster than India, 
most Mrican nations and a large number of Latin American and 
Asian nations would experience higher percentage increases in 
population than would India.35 
In the context of serious ecological risk and the already vast 
dimensions of global poverty at the level of real human need, such 
projections make the following question unavoidable. Is replacement 
fertility an adequate goal of fertility reduction? Here knowledge 
eludes us. Due to the gravity of the global ecological crisis and the 
immensity of existing human deprivation, one must believe that it 
would be highly desirable for all nations to seek to achieve or con-
tinue fertility rates at least modestly below replacement level on a 
temporary basis. Beyond that, it is very likely that at least some na-
tions with currently high birth rates will to some extent repeat 
China's decision to seek a temporary rate of fertility substantially 
below replacement.36 They will see that despite generous economic 
32. This statement is the result both of my very rough adaptation of another Frejka 
hypothetical projection which had imagined reduction of fertility to replacement in the 
developing countries by the year 2000, see T. FREJKA supra note 31 at 19, and of the accepted 
rule of thumb that a nation's population growing at 3% per year will still eventually double 
despite reduction to replacement fertility over a ten-year period, see Gardner, supra note **. 
The developing nations' population, exclusive of China, is growing at about 2.4% per year. 
1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1. 
33. One writer projected the world's ultimate population at about 8.5 billion if worldwide 
fertility were to drop to replacement levels by 1990. See Cherfas, The World Fertility Survey 
Conference: Population Bomb Revisited, I SCIENCE 80 11, 18 (Nov. 1980). My rough interpola-
tion of Frejka's projections would yield a figure somewhere between 7 and 8 billion. 
34. The World Bank has estimated that reduction to replacement fertility by the year 2000 
(about eight years later than my suggested goal) would give India an ultimate stationery 
population of 1.375 billion and Bangladesh 215 million; that reduction to replacement fertility 
by the year 2020 would give India an ultimate stationery population of 1.7 billion and 
Bangladesh 290 million. R.S. McNAMARA, ADDRESS TO THE WORLD BANK BOARD OF GoVERNORS 
10-11 (1979). My own "guess-estimates" are but rough interpolations from the bank's 
awesome projections. 
35. For a recent listing of current popUlation growth rates by nation, see generally 1983 
DATA SHEET, supra note 1. 
36. Concerning China's attempt, see Let Only Two Children Bloom, Science and the Citizen, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN CCXVII (No.4, Apr. 1980); China's one-child rule halves growth rate, 
London Times, Oct. 28, 1982, at 6, col. 3. 
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development assistance their resources cannot be expected to sup-
port the substantial population increases that will occur even after 
their early attainment of replacement fertility. For such nations, fer-
tility rates moderately below replacement-say, fertility of about 1.5 
children per woman-will become a temporary necessity. Where 
there are already signs of severe regional stress, population surging 
nations would be extremely wise to decide soon to seek moderately 
below-replacement fertility rates on a gradual temporary basis. 
Even if they succeed in reaching that temporary goal by the year 
2000, they would still experience very considerable increases in pop-
ulation for quite some time.87 
The decision to seek temporary, at least moderately subreplace-
ment fertility rates is apt to be an extremely controversial one in any 
nation that decides to do so. In pursuing the one-child family goal, 
the Beijing government in China is taking real political and moral 
risks, including the risk that it may be resorting to or may resort to 
excessive means.88 One suspects, however, that the Chinese govern-
ment would not be promoting the one-child family without being to-
tally convinced that such a policy was a prerequisite for China's 
economic survival and minimal well-being. 
It is important that the justifiably controversial question of 
whether to pursue a sUbreplacement fertility policy not cast doubt on 
what should not be controversial: humankind must achieve fertility 
rates no higher than replacement and must do so as soon as is pos-
sible humanely. 89 
37. Fearing that accomplishment of the replacement fertility goal may not be an adequate 
response to the population and resources crises, Worldwatch Institute's Lester Brown has pro-
posed that the developed nations seek actual ZPG by 1985 and that the developing nations 
reduce birth rates to 25 per thousand by 1985 and then achieve ZPG by about 2015. The 
resulting stabilized world population would be slightly less than 6 billion persons. See L. 
BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS 37-50 (1979). In his later book Brown stretches out his proposed 
ZPG timetable, asking the industrial nations to reach ZPG by 2000 and asking the developing 
nations to do so by about 2020. See L. BROWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SocIETY 144-51 
(1981). 
38. See China's New Birth Policy: One BaJrg Is Enough, SCIENCE CCVI, at 429 (Oct. 26, 
1979). 
39. Among the strategies that a nation might use to achieve the no-higher-than-replacement 
or some other lower fertility goal are population education, family planning services, and 
economic incentives and disincentives. Unless individual reproductive freedom were to be 
reduced to absolute zero (which is almost as unlikely as it would be undesirable), even after the 
desired decline of fertility a nation's overall fertility rate would almost surely fluctuate to 
some degree from time to time. Because some of those fluctuations are apt to yield temporary 
"above ceiling" fertility rates, an obvious question of interpretation arises with respect to the 
idea of a societal "fertility ceiling," whether that ceiling is set at replacement or at any other 
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The following would likely constitute a reasonable set of goals. 
Within the next year or two all developed nations with fertility rates 
currently above replacement should achieve, and they and all other 
developed nations should thereafter not significantly exceed, the 
replacement fertility ceiling. With the help of SUbstantially increased 
international family planning aid where needed, all developing na-
tions should do likewise approximately by 1992.40 Nations whose 
popUlation growth, even with replacement fertility and generous 
economic aid, is expected to exceed their resources' probable carry-
ing capacity should then move gradually to a temporary fertility rate 
of about 1.5, reaching this latter goal by about 2000 to 2005. 
If the above goals were to be met, the resulting stabilized world 
population, actual ZPG, likely would fall somewhere between six and 
seven billion persons, with almost all of the population increase oc-
curring in the developing nations.41 Under this scenario, there would 
fertility rate: What if a nation experiences one or more years of below ceiling fertility rates but 
then its fertility swings upward to an above ceiling figure? So long as this subsequent above 
ceiling situation didn't do more than offset the population effects of the nation's earlier below 
ceiling rates, should the later situation be viewed as being in compliance with the fertility ceil-
ing? Obviously, a point eventually could be reached where the answer would have to be "yes." 
Were a nation's fertility to continue fluctuating only or primarily in the below replacement 
ranges, the nation would eventually need to do what a few industrial nations have already 
done: seek a temporarily above replacement fertility rate-perhaps the happiest political and 
social task imaginable-in order to prevent an excessive decline in population. For the over-
whelming majority of nations, however, at any plausibly expectable below replacement rate 
the foregoing possible but highly unlikely need would be centuries away. Absent the massive 
mortality we all must strive to avoid, and contrary to the almost surely exaggerated "national 
disappearance fears" of a few governments in nations presently at or below their replace-
ment rate, a shortage of people is simply not the likely problem anytime in the relevant future. 
Nor would any expected below-replacement fertility rates cause any nation anything 
near the age distribution difficulties caused us in the United States by the post-World-War II 
baby boom. Accordingly, at least with respect to replacement as a nation's fertility ceiling, one 
must say that in view of the ecological burden and risk of servicing even a "mere" five, six, or 
seven billion human population, for the foreseeable future it would be extremely desirable if 
even in the case of a nation whose fertility rate had fallen below its replacement rate, that na-
tion would regard any return of its fertility rate to above replacement as an occasion meriting 
appropriate efforts toward a reduction back to replacement as soon as humanely possible. This 
approach would reduce the global ecological burden and risk, and it would increase the well-
being of all peoples involved. 
40. There is neither magic nor precision in the proposed difference in target dates between 
the developed and the developing nations. Some difference appears necessary and justified for 
at least two reasons. First, those developed nations not already at or below replacement fertili-
ty generally are not far above it, while most of the developing nations are currently well above 
replacement. Second, the developed nations generally have extensive, highly developed health 
care systems in which the full array of family planning services either already exists or can be 
implemented quickly. 
41. The resulting world population total would, of course, be affected by the number and 
size of nations who experienced temporary sUbreplacement fertility rates, by the amount of 
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be a substantial deceleration of humanity's present rate of popula-
tion growth prior to the realization of actual ZPG. 42 In contrast, the 
six to seven billion population level would be reached substantially 
earlier as a prelude to much higher levels if present fertility rates 
continue or slightly decrease and an early massive catastrophe is 
avoided. The chances of humanity's having adequate preparation 
time to service the needs of all its future members and to do so in 
ways that won't demolish or damage the planet's life sustaining 
vitality would, thus, be vastly improved if the ZPG timetable recom-
mended above were to be accomplished. 
B. Goal Assessment Continued 
The potential harm even from humanity's rather modest delay 
past 1992 in complying with the replacement fertility ceiling is stag-
gering to imagine in two respects, both of which threaten massive 
occurrences of premature death and disease. The first respect con-
sists of the resulting steeper numerical increases in human need that 
will tax the planet's economic and ecological resources in the decades 
immediately ahead. The second is the necessarily heavier long-term 
ecological burden that (absent an earlier catastrophic mortality) the 
resulting higher total human population would impose. Concerning 
the latter consequence, consider this example. If the task of achiev-
ing a replacement fertility ceiling worldwide takes two decades in-
stead of one, representing success by the year 2002 rather than by 
the year 1992, approximately one billion human beings will be added 
to the world's projected stabilized population outcome-an expected 
total of about eight to nine billion rather than about seven to eight 
billion persons.43 Again, one must say, "absent massive cata-
strophe," the risks of which increase with population. Subject, of 
course, to this all-too-plausible qualification, scenarios involving sub-
stantially greater delays would yield dramatically higher population 
those rates, and by the duration of their occurrence. None of these variables can be predicted 
with confidence presently. 
42. The substantial slowing of the growth rate would occur because the fertility rates under 
the proposed scenario are so much lower than the fertility rates generally prevailing in the 
developing nations. For a recent listing of fertility rates by nation, see generally 1983 DATA 
SHEET, supra note 1. The total fertility rate for all the developing nations, exclusive of China, 
is estimated at 5.2 children per woman. [d. 
43. The comparison stated is my gross interpolation from T. FREJKA, supra note 31, at 19 & 
22. For consistency, neither of my projections here includes the effect of any possible later 
subreplacement fertility, a variable whose presence can hardly be assumed with any con-
fidence. 
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outcomes. For example, the gradual achievement of worldwide re-
placement fertility over the next sixty years yields a projected world 
population of over 15 billion.44 Anyone who thinks that a difference 
in human population of a "mere" one billion is anything other than 
enormous in its potential ecological impact perhaps has forgotten 
that the one billion figure was the world's approximate total human 
population in 1820. 
The careful reader is apt to notice my omission thus far of what 
well may be the most likely array of risks in an overpopulated world: 
increasingly intense and bitter social conflict; rampant violence and 
political terrorism; international extortion; epidemics of minor or 
local wars; and vastly increased chances of nuclear holocaust. I have 
neglected these risks not because I am able to regard them as unlike-
ly, but because I am convinced that even without them, taking the 
ecological risks of continued above-replacement fertility rates for 
any unnecessary duration is itself a morally indefensible policy. 
When, in addition, we envision the outcomes just enumerated, all of 
whose probabilities multiply as world population moves higher and 
higher, we must conclude that any reasonably avoidable continuation 
of above-replacement fertility rates by the world's nations would be 
indescribably evil and insane. 
There is at least one more illusory intellectual escape from this 
judgment. It is the supermoral notion that were all humankind 
religiously to commit itself to a truly saintly degree of economic 
asceticism, forswearing all the unnecessary gifts of industrial 
technology, we could postpone the need to worry about population 
limits for a long time, perhaps even indefinitely. My response is as 
follows. It is often the case that a proposer of public policy is ethically 
required to include in his or her proposals a nontrivial amount of 
citizens' altruistic or enlightened self-denial. Conditions well may re-
quire proposing a degree of self-denial that seems politically 
unrealistic. But to advocate any public policy on an assumption of 
man's achieving a degree of unselfishness far beyond what could be 
hoped for plausibly under even the most effective and inspiring 
political-educational-moralleadership is itself reckless. In short, the 
overwhelming majority of human beings are not about to be per-
suaded to forswear all or nearly all the non-necessity benefits of 
technology and affluence. This is most certainly true in the affluent 
nations; we are much too irrevocably addicted. Likewise, the 
44. See id. 
872 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:853 
developing nations have received a glimpse of the secular Promised 
Land of Plenty which is too enticing to settle for an ascetic 
wilderness. If anything, these added realities require that the 
chances of ecological disaster from continuing anything like present 
population growth be revised upwards from that suggested earlier. 
This is not meant to imply that the world's presently affluent 
peoples won't be called upon to give up a substantial portion of their 
environmentally burdensome affluence. Nor is it meant to imply that 
the developing nations will not have to practice environmental and 
ecological care in pursuing their economic goals. Put simply, neither 
the affluent nations nor the developing nations can be expected to 
show enough economic restraint to make sustained commitment to 
fertility rates no higher than replacement (and in some cases, tem-
porarily subreplacement rates) an unnecessary or deferrable policy 
for either group. Otherwise, in the affluent nations substantially in-
creasing population would seriously undercut or vitiate reductions 
achieved in per capita energy use, resource depletion, and pollution. 
In the developing nations, where substantial economic growth is 
needed just to provide everyone with basic necessities, soaring 
population would increase enormously the aggregate ecological 
harm resulting from increased per capita GNP. If humanity ignores 
the need for fertility limits and devotes itself to a quixotic attack 
upon material consumption alone, its quest for sustainable well-being 
is almost surely doomed to failure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to regard the existing world population growth outlook 
with anything other than extreme alarm, we must believe that tech-
nology and/or luck and/or prayer46 can and very likely will supply 
every single physical resource required to sustain the life and the 
physical health of both: (a) a rapidly increasing human population in 
the decades ahead; and (b) a vastly increased human population in 
the indefinite future thereafter. Furthermore, we must believe that 
the consumptive economic activities of an enormously increased 
humankind can be limited (without worldwide subjection to tyranny) 
to an extent sufficient to preserve the planet's continued capacity to 
support massively large numbers of people. Finally, we must believe 
45. But I believe I recall being told that tempting the Lord thy God is a grievous sin. An ex-
ample would be intentionally jumping from a 20-story window and praying for deliverance en 
route. 
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that in a future world where most or all natural beauty would by then 
surely have been destroyed in trying to meet the enormously in-
creased sum of human want and need, the probable outcome will be 
this: an immensely larger and far more crowded human race, blessed 
with an enlarged and more widely dispersed supply of governmental 
and private weapons of massive and individualized violence, can and 
will struggle peaceably to meet its needs and, thriving in the best of 
mental health, compete peaceably for affluence and for other scarce 
values. 
It is, of course, possible that all the foregoing required beliefs, if 
daringly given the chance, might come true. But ethics, a basic 
respect for life, prohibits humanity from taking so awesome a set of 
risks when there is no necessity for doing so. The stakes in human 
life are simply too high; the risks are simply too substantial. If the 
technological superoptimists and the ecological superoptimists 
aren't misleading us tragically concerning the consequences of con-
tinued above-replacement fertility, there is a very substantial prob-
ability that the moral superoptimists are. 
